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ESSAYS
THE LIBERAL SOCIETY AS LIBERATION
THEOLOGY
MICHAEL NOVAK*
I will accept the definitions of liberation theology that
any liberation theologian offers. It is fair to hear people out
in their own terms and to accept their labels and symbols on
their terms. Insofar, though, as liberation theologians have a
"preferential option for the poor," and seek to reduce "re-
pression" and "human rights abuses," there is a fairly clear
and stable standard that, in its own terms, liberation theology
must meet: Does it liberate? Actually. In practice. Does it actu-
ally lift up the poor so that they are no longer poor? Does it
actually institute new structures of human rights, so that citi-
zens are not tortured and their other rights are not violated?
In this respect, the books of liberation theologians are
disappointing. They say that they are interested in praxis. But
one learns very little from them about the practical institu-
tions they will put in place the day after the revolution that
they seek. Institutionally, how will they protect human rights?
Institutionally, how will they achieve the economic growth
that raises up the poor? One will learn far more about pre-
paring for the praxis of actual liberation from reading The
Federalist than from any volume of liberation theology writ-
ten thus far.
That is why I now turn to the liberation theology native
to North America, and the second term in our debate, "the
liberal society." The first persons to be called, and to call
themselves, "liberals" were so named because they sought
three liberations. The infant United States was the first cruci-
ble in which their experiment was tried. They sought libera-
tion from tyranny and torture in the political sphere; liberation
from the tyranny of poverty in the economic sphere; and liberty
of conscience, information and ideas in the religious, cultural,
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and moral sphere.
Quite naturally, the tri-couleur was the symbol of the first
liberal nations: one color for each liberation. True, some of
the first liberals (especially on the Continent) were harshly
anti-religious. The anti-clerical, anti-religious ferocity of
French liberalism was one of the forces that drove the newly
founded P~res de Saint Croix to emigrate from France to
found the University of Notre Dame. Thus, Liberalisme
achieved a bad name in the Catholic tradition. Often, too, its
true import has not been grasped. Among early liberals, my
favorites are those, perhaps better called Whigs, who grasped
the importance of tradition, religion, liturgy, community and
history in the liberal project: not only Lord Acton, but also,
to some extent, Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, Edmund
Burke, and above all Alexis de Tocqueville. Tocqueville op-
posed the socialists of France on one side, the traditionalists
on the other. He once said that the heart of the Christian
faith is liberal. And he understood the originality of the
American experiment.
A hundred years ago, when the people of France wished
to offer a proper symbol for the United States, they contrib-
uted the Statue of Liberty. This Statue has ever been the
proper symbol of the liberal society, and of North American
liberal society. "Send me your tired, your poor," that Statue
says, as if to underline the preferential option of this system
for the poor. And most of our families did come here poor.
Think back to your own families, circa 1935, or earlier. Were
they from a privileged class? Or were they poor? Generation
after generation, the poor have streamed to America and
been lifted out of poverty. This "liberation theology" actually
does liberate. (Of course, I have always been glad my grand-
mother could not read English and therefore could not read
those other, more ambiguous words of welcome on the
Statue of Liberty: "The wretched refuse.") My family was
not aristocratic. Nor were your parents, or those of most
other Catholics in the United States.
In fact, as Gertrude Himmelfarb makes clear in her mag-
isterial study, The Idea of Poverty, one of the great motivating
drives of the first liberals, as distinct from the Malthusians,
was their recognition that poverty is a form of tyranny, and
that poverty as tyranny can and should be broken. Because
these first liberals, particularly Adam Smith, had discovered
the causes of wealth, they knew that poverty could be broken,
in a systematic and sustained way. Because it could be, it must
be; a new moral obligation thereby entered human history.
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Concerning poverty, resignation is not enough. Humans must
act to diminish it. Underdevelopment is not good enough.
There is a moral obligation to achieve development, along all
its human axes. The motto of the state of New York ex-
presses this: "Excelsior"
In 1800, the first liberals contemplated a world of some
800 million living souls, most living under tyranny, in pov-
erty, and in ignorance (not only in illiteracy, but in ignorance
of basic hygiene and fundamental medicine). The average
age of death was about nineteen. In France, perhaps the most
developed nation, the average age of the oppressed sex at
death was twenty-seven, the average age of death of the op-
pressor sex, twenty-three. The condition of man in his natu-
ral state offered by Thomas Hobbes was taken to be reasona-
bly descriptive of human life: "Solitary, poor, nasty, brutish,
and short."1 As Pope John Paul II recently said, there are
800 million hungry persons on this planet today. That is a
sad, but true, fact. The liberal task has yet to be completed.
But what the Pope did not say is that, 185 years after 1800,
there are four billion people who are not hungry, that many
more are living (because of giant strides of creativity in
medicine, pharmaceuticals, immunizations, and the like), and
are now living to an average age of nearly sixty.
In 1948, Karl Marx described the bourgeois revolution
as the greatest transformation ever experienced by the
human race. At that time, he had not seen the half of it.
So I am not talking about an abstract ideal, but about a
real flesh-and-blood system that has dramatically altered
human history. In particular, I want to talk about the United
States as it is, as one embodiment of the liberal society. If the
United States is not democratic, which nation is? If the
United States is not capitalist, which nation is? If the United
States is not pluralistic and free in conscience, what place on
earth is? Yet this actual, real system in which we live is based
upon an idea, a conception of order, painstakingly worked
out by our Founders. (Read the Constitutional debates, The
Federalist, and the private papers and correspondence of
these practical visionaries.) They knew our system was unlike
that of France, Great Britain, Italy, Morocco, or any other.
They described it with full seriousness as Novus ordo seclorum:
new, an ordo, an order rooted in a new conception, and "of
the ages," a new turning point in all of human history.
The Founders were the offspring of a biblical people.
1. T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN pt 1., ch. 13 (London 1651).
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For more than a thousand years, devout readers of the Bible
had reflected on its images of the person, the community, the
nature and destiny of human beings, the common good, and
an order worthy of what God had taught them about human
dignity. They had learned of the inalienable dignity of every
single person, of the need to promote the general welfare, of
the necessity for republican virtue, and of the need to build a
new republic worthy at last of human dignity. Jefferson, in-
deed, thought of the United States as "the second Israel. ' 2
Parenthetically, it is here that the second draft of the
U.S. Catholic Bishops' "Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social
Teaching and the U.S. Economy" still errs, precisely in its
section on the Bible. The second draft summarizes what con-
temporary biblical scholars find of interest in the Bible. But
the current interests of the biblical scholars of this genera-
tion, whose wisdom will wither as the grass of the field, is not
decisive. To accumulate biblical texts, written for a pre-dem-
ocratic, pre-capitalist, pre-growth period of history, and then
to leap from that context to today is pure fundamentalism. Of
far more decisive importance is the impact of the Bible
through the centuries, upon devout and practical persons
who reflected upon it, in trying by many and often bloody
experiments to design institutions worthy of the human dig-
nity affirmed in the Bible. One must see the Bible as it actu-
ally worked in the history of political economy, as yeast works
in dough. One must study how it affected Catholic social
thought from Augustine to Aquinas to Lord Acton and,
above all, how it affected the social vision of the new Ameri-
can republic, in its political, economic and moral systems.
The Bible was decisive for the invention of the system we en-
joy in the United States, mired in sin as every human system
is, the system whose proper and most telling name is demo-
cratic capitalism.
Many Catholics miss the full impact of that concept.
They think of "capitalism" alone, an "unfettered market,"
an "invisible hand," solely a "free enterprise" system, "liber-
tarianism." This was never the American idea. (It was cer-
tainly not the idea of Adam Smith, who canonized the quite
different term "political economy," or of John Stuart Mill,
who wrote The Principles of Political Economy.) In political
economy, both the political system and the moral-cultural sys-
tem possess crucial power.
For example, a cultural system rooted in Judaism and
2. See infra note 7 and accompanying text.
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Christianity will insist upon concern for the poor. Through
the political system, its citizens will seek to promote the gen-
eral welfare, to design a system of universal education, and to
continue to experiment with a system of care for the poor.
Such steps do not contradict a successful capitalist economy;
on the contrary, they are indispensable to it. Similarly, a free
market economy requires regulation and cannot function
without it. Welfare for those too old, too young, the disabled,
and the unfortunate is an altogether proper task for political
economy, especially among peoples of Jewish, Christian, and
humanist roots. In both the world of theory and the real
world of practice, political economy is three systems in one: a
political system, an economic, and a moral-cultural sys-
tem-all three mutually interdependent.
The most apt descriptive name for this system runs par-
allel to the phrase "political economy." Democratic in its po-
litical system, its economic system is properly designated capi-
talism. Further, this name, "democratic capitalism," implies
respect for liberty of conscience, information, and ideas: in
short, pluralism in its moral and cultural institutions. Such a
tripartite system represents the three full "liberations" that
are the inheritance of the liberal society.
This concept of social order is opposed to both the illib-
eralism of the Right and the illiberalism of the Left. It is op-
posed to both traditionalism (e.g., of Latin American and
other Third World types) and to socialism (whether of the
Soviet or of the Socialist International). In a large sense, so-
cial democratic and democratic socialist societies (such as
Sweden) are variants of the democratic capitalist idea. They
tilt toward the left or statist side. They lean to the "political"
in "political economy," that is, to the state. They allow some
autonomy to the economic system and to the moral-cultural
system. They are not fully socialist. The full-blown demo-
cratic capitalist idea, by contrast, requires a dynamic and
fluid balance among the three independent-interdependent
systems. It insists, therefore, upon due autonomy for the eco-
nomic system and the moral-cultural system vis-A-vis the state.
Three biblical ideas, among others, lie behind the demo-
cratic capitalist reality. Without such ideas the latter could
not have come into existence. As Jacques Maritain saw, the
modern conception of democracy springs from centuries of
meditation upon the biblical notion of humankind. And as
Max Weber saw, capitalism cannot be defined solely in terms
of ancient and traditional social techniques such as private
property, markets, profits, and incentives, since all these ex-
19851
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isted even in biblical times in such ancient cities as Jerusalem.
In Weber's eyes, capitalism brought something new into his-
tory, first seen near the end of the eighteenth century. Its
originality lay less in technique than in the domain of the
human spirit. (Thence his title: The Protestant Catholic and the
Spirit of Capitalism.) This new thing, for which he reserves the
name of "capitalism," consists of a new morality and a new
set of moral obligations. The three biblical ideas mentioned
above led, during centuries of trial and error, to its inven-
tion. One can discern this originality in the differences of
ordo, or system, in Latin America and North America.
In 1776, Adam Smith had already predicted that Latin
America would eventually end in poverty and tyranny (ex-
actly as the liberation theologians of today describe). Why?
Because the Latin American experiment consisted in recon-
structing an ancient order, that of the Holy Roman Empire: a
mercantilist view of wealth as gold and silver, an economy
based chiefly upon a landed aristocracy, and the unity of
church and state. By contrast, Smith recognized that "the
colonies" of North America were attempting a new experi-
ment, based upon an original conception of social order, a
novus ordo.
What made the ordo of the United States different from
any in Europe or elsewhere? What was new about it? Three
of its novelties were biblical in inspiration.
(1) The Jewish-Christian notion of sin lay behind the funda-
mental division of systems, the division of powers in the political
system, and a pervasive systemic concern with checks and balances.
The Jewish-Christian conception of man is empirically based.
It holds that every human being sometimes sins. Therefore,
no person, class, or group may be entrusted with total power.
Every human, even a saint or a philosopher-king, given total
power, sooner or later will be tempted to torture others (for
the common good). Therefore, one cannot trust political
leaders with power over conscience, ideas, or information. The
institutions of religion, intellectual life, and the press must be
given powers separate from those of the political system. This
idea had been pioneered in the free cities and free republics
of Europe since the Edicts of Toleration.
More original was the principle that political leaders
should not be trusted with power over economic institutions.
To an unprecedented degree, economic institutions in the
United States were separated from the state. The result, as
Oscar Handlin has pointed out, was that in 1800, in a nation
of roughly four million persons, there were more private cor-
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porations in the United States than in all of Europe.'
The reality of human sinfulness, therefore, led to the in-
vention of an unprecedented division of social systems, the
separation of the American social system into three relatively
equal, but quite different systems: political, economic, and
moral-cultural. From this conception of order arises both a
check upon human sinfulness, and a liberation of historical
dynamism.
Madison maintained that, in designing a new order, the
founders must build neither for angels nor for brutes, but for
humans as we are. Any plausibly successful order must re-
present a political economy designed for sinners, the only
moral majority there is. In The Federalist No. 51, Madison
wrote:
But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflec-
tions on human nature? If men were angels, no government
would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither
external nor internal controls on government would be nec-
essary. In framing a government which is to be adminis-
tered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you
must first enable the government to control the governed;
and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A depen-
dence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on
government; but experience has taught men the necessity
of auxiliary precautions.4
The motto on our coins expresses the Founders' concept
quite well: "In God We Trust"-that is, "nobody else."
(2) The Jewish-Christian concept, beginning in Genesis, that
humans are made in the image of God the Creator, taught the early
Americans that the vocation of Christians, Jews, and humanists is
not merely to be passive, resigned, and reconciled to history but, on
the contrary, to change history and to be creative, to pioneer, and to
persevere in being inventors of a new order. The short answer to
Adam Smith's Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth
of Nations is: The cause of wealth is creativity. Not natural
resources. Not labor. Not planning. Rather, human wit,
intelligence, inquiry, invention-in a word, the old caput
("head"), from which the name for the system, "capitalism,"
is appropriately derived. Until Adam Smith, wealth (identi-
fied with gold, silver, and the like) was thought to be limited,
3. Handlin, The Development of the Corporation, in THE CORPORATION: A
THEOLOGICAL INQUIRY 7 (1981).
4. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 U. Madison).
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a zero-sum. It could not be created, only taken. "If the rich
get richer, the poor get poorer." This traditional relation was
erroneously thought to be causal. The classic villain was the
miser, or hoarder, whose wealth (necessarily) was subtracted
from the common store.
After Adam Smith, a new morality came into play. If
wealth can be created, then, seeing the tyi-anny and misery
inflicted by poverty, Smith discerned a new moral obligation:
the moral obligation of development, the moral imperative to
raise every poor person in the world out of poverty. If new
wealth can be created, the miser who hoards his gold is less a
villain than a fool, and thus the miser disappeared from the
ranks of literary villains.
Three brief examples may clarify the power of this in-
sight. First, a contrast between Brazil and Japan. Brazil is
larger than the continental United States (excluding Alaska),
and is perhaps among the top three nations in the world in
natural resources. With an almost identical population (in
1980, about 118 million), Japan is roughly about the size of
Montana. It has almost no natural resources. Yet Japan pro-
duces seven percent of gross world product, Brazil under two
percent. If natural resources were the cause of wealth, Brazil
would be rich, Japan poor. In three ways, Japanese society is
ordered to creativity: in the design of its system;,in the organ-
ization of the Japanese personality by mind; and in
inventiveness.
Second, a reflection on "natural resources." If we had
sought through the centuries for metaphor for poverty, we
would have said: "Poor as a Bedouin." The poor fellows did
not even have water or shade. Yet what do we say of them
today? "Oil-rich Arab nations." What made the difference?
The invention of the piston engine, and the discovery of how
to refine gasoline from crude oil. Invention turned oil from
useless, noisome stuff to "black gold." So it is with almost
everything designated as a "resource." The stuff of nature
becomes a "resource" only when creative intellect discovers a
use for it. There are no known limits to the wealth the Crea-
tor has hidden in nature, waiting for humans to detect its
clues.
Third, as Adam Smith drew many of his central insights
from "the colonies," arguing that Great Britain should learn
from them, so also the Americans learned much from his In-
quiry. One such lesson led to the Homestead Act, opening up
the American middle west to what Abraham Lincoln called
'free labor-the just and generous, and prosperous system,
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which opens the way for all-gives hope to all, and energy,
and progress, and improvement of condition to all."' The
principle is that there is more intelligence in millions of indi-
vidual citizens than in any small band of central planners or
government officials, however brilliant. Whereas the Ameri-
can "slave states" were built upon the Latin American idea of
the large plantations of a landed aristocracy, the North
American idea was free labor and an independent citizenry.
Congress further insisted upon land grant colleges in every
new territory, on another Smithian principle: viz., that the
cause of development is intellect.
(3) The distinctive Jewish-Christian idea of community-not
based on birth or kin or territory or religious unity, but on free and
voluntary covenant-led to the American discovery of a new princi-
ple of the new science of politics: the principle of voluntary associa-
tion. There are three aspects to the new democratic-capitalist
conception of community.
First, Adam Smith called his book The Wealth of Nations
not The Wealth of Individuals. His was the first vision of uni-
versal, worldwide development. His is preeminently a social
vision. The vision of democratic capitalism will not be at-
tained until a sound material base is placed under every sin-
gle person on this planet.
Second, the chief institutional invention of democratic
capitalist societies is not the individual (already magnified by
the aristocracy) but the corporation and the association.
These social forms provide a new way for human beings to
organize themselves for voluntary social action, including ec-
onomic action, in independence from the state.
In addition, and quite paradoxically, the market system
obliges individuals to be other-regarding, not necessarily from
charity, but even from enlightened self-interest. No matter
how good you think the product or the service you offer, you
will get nowhere in a market system unless you actually meet
the needs of others.
Thirdly, democratic capitalist societies develop a new
type of personality in their young, aptly called the communi-
tarian personality. We do not raise our children to be "rug-
ged individualists." On the contrary, we raise them to be
open to others, gregarious, active in many groups, skilled in
association. By the time she was seven, my youngest daughter
5. A. Lincoln, Address before the Wisconsin State Agricultural Soci-
ety, Milwaukee, Wis. (September 30, 1859), reprinted in 3 THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 471, 479 (R. Basler ed. 1953).
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already belonged to more organizations, attended more dif-
ferent meetings, and took part in more activities than both
my wife and I could drive her to. Democratic capitalist
youngsters have a larger range of social skills than those de-
veloped in any socialist society. Even our most beloved
sports-our public liturgies-are team sports.
In short, the liberal society, benefiting from centuries of
reflection upon biblical themes such as sin, creativity, and a
new conception of community (universal, associative, and
communitarian), has set a benchmark for other social orders.
The liberal society, to repeat, is based upon three liberations:
liberation of conscience, ideas and information (the institu-
tions of pluralism); liberation from tyranny and torture (dem-
ocratic institutions); and liberation from poverty (capitalist
institutions, in concert with moral-cultural and political
institutions).
Liberation theology claims to have a "preferential option
for the poor." But, the day after the revolution, what sort of
economic institutions does liberation theology plan to set in
place, that will actually help the poor no longer to be poor?
What sort of institutions will it set up to block tyranny and
prevent torture? What sort of institutions will it set up to
guarantee liberty of conscience, ideas, and information? If
liberation theology succeeds in helping to construct such in-
stitutions as these, then it will meet the tests of the liberal
society, and achieve genuine human liberation. Then we are
all "liberation theologians;" and if not, not.
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APPENDIX: Clarification of Democratic Capitalism
Several misunderstandings of the nature of democratic
capitalism are so frequently encountered that I append a
short "catechism" to clarify certain themes.
1. Capitalism in the United States is morally bankrupt. It has
been saved from itself by political and moral energies emanating
from elsewhere.
The American system, from the beginning, relied upon
all three fundamental social systems: (1) the institutions of the
moral-cultural system (churches, press, universities, families,
and associations of all sorts); (2) the institutions of the politi-
cal system (executive, legislative, judicial; parties, citizen or-
ganizations and movements; regulatory agencies of govern-
ment, patent laws, and the system of private property; and
the welfare functions of localities, states, and federal govern-
ment); and (3) economic institutions (including habits of en-
terprise and invention; corporations large and small;
partnerships; unions; associations of employees, stockholders,
consumers, professionals, industries, and commerce).
Significant moral impulses, principles, habits, and impor-
tant institutional protections are found in each of the three
systems. No one of the three systems aims to cover the whole
of life.
In particular, our government has always provided many
goods that the economic system alone does not, not only in
protecting the legal bases of a commercial republic, and not
only in the necessary regulation of commercial life, but also
in its legitimate educational and welfare functions.
The legitimate functions of political and moral-cultural
institutions are not contrary to a capitalist system, but are its
necessary adjuncts, supports, and counter-balance. The
Homestead Act, the land-grant colleges, the patent and copy-
right laws, rural electrification, the many Highway Acts, So-
cial Security and the Progressive Income Tax are a few
among many such legitimate functions.
2. In America, laissez-faire capitalism has been modified by
socialist ideas, leading to the "mixed economy" of the "welfare
state." Much that is good in the system is not due to capitalism, but
to socialism.
The expression "mixed economy" suggests that two in-
compatible ideals have been "blended." This does not accu-
rately depict either the original idea of the American experi-
ment or its historical unfolding. From the beginning, the
19851
JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY
Founders recognized the rights inhering in citizens as moral-
cultural agents, as political agents and as economic agents.
Their basic conception was "political economy." The econ-
omy and the polity were joined together from the start. Ours
is not, then, an artificially "mixed economy." The original
conception of "political economy" implies a legitimate role
for each of three fundamental systems. The concept of "po-
litical economy" explains how the expansion of the "welfare
state" since the 1930's could be justified as coherent with
America's original premises, including, "to promote the gen-
eral welfare."
3. Social democratic or democratic socialist regimes such as
Sweden, the Netherlands, Israel, West Germany, and Great Britain
are morally superior to the U.S. model, economically at least as dy-
namic, and politically more democratic.
The political economies of such regimes are (in my opin-
ion) most accurately classified as variants of the democratic
capitalist ideal, somewhat more heavily tilted than the United
States toward state controls. Their own socialist parties criti-
cize them for being insufficiently socialist. The socialist bloc
classifies them as "capitalist." Such regimes do, in fact, re-
spect the principles of private property, markets, incentives,
invention, and growth.
Many of us prefer the U.S. model because it is more in-
ventive and dynamic, and less burdened by statist regulation
and controls. This difference leads some to think of the West-
ern European nations as closer than the United States to the
"socialist" ideal. But the West Germans, for example, strenu-
ously insist that their "social market economy" is not socialist.
Some analysts (myself included) think the greater role of the
state in Western European nations is a defect, and that the
burden of social spending they have inflicted upon them-
selves in the name of security is diminishing their economic
and cultural vitalities. Since 1970, while the United States has
created some 29 million new jobs (as of October, 1985), such
Western European regimes have been losing jobs. In Sweden,
many analysts rightly speak of the "crisis" of the welfare
state, already committed to absorbing fifty percent of GNP in
taxes, and by the year 2000 more than sixty percent.
4. Capitalism has not worked in Latin America.
Latin American economies are not capitalist but pre-capi-
talist. They are heavily burdened by traditionalist state bu-
reaucracies, which dominate the economy. To have markets,
private property, and a private sphere is traditional, not in
[Vol. 2
THE LIBERAL SOCIETY
itself capitalist. Capitalist economies go beyond traditionalist
economies in setting limits upon state activities in the eco-
nomic sphere; in their attention to education, invention, and
creativity; in the scope they allow to enterprise and private
economic associations; in the public virtues they nourish; and
in the balance they try to strike between the political system
and the economic system. In addition, capitalist economies
operate by a different "spirit" (Max Weber's shrewd word)
than do traditionalist economies, by different virtues and
habits, and by a different range of economic institutions.
These institutions include patents and copyrights, research
and development, easy access to legal incorporation, incen-
tives for growth, the availability of easy credit for the poor
and underprivileged in order that they may launch enter-
prises of their own, reliance upon a large and constantly
growing small business sector, and bankruptcy laws. Latin
America has not yet passed from a pre-capitalist, traditional-
ist system to a capitalist system.
5. Capitalism offers no hope in the Third World.
On the contrary, those Third World countries that fol-
low the capitalist model soon join the ranks of "developed"
nations; e.g., the capitalist nations of East Asia. Even in so-
cialist countries, the movement is towards proven capitalist
economic methods, as in the cases of Fabian India, Marxist
China, Hungary, Yugoslavia, and even the U.S.S.R. itself. So-
cialism was not invented as a system designed to produce eco-
nomic development. Its main historical purpose has been po-
litical control. The socialist ideal of economic organization is
being modified rapidly by a thousand capitalist qualifications,
because of repeated historical failures in the one case and
success stories in the other.
Wealth in a truly capitalist nation wells up from the bot-
tom, especially in the small business and small farm sector,
and in the entrepreneurial genius of many who were born
poor.
6. Capitalist economies are morally decadent, emphasize "hav-
ing" rather than "being," and engender an epidemic of "loneli-
ness" and "alienation."
These are empirical assertions. They must be demon-
strated. Are moral and religious vitalities in the United States
weaker, empirically, than in other nations? Capitalist econo-
mies allow an immense range of free choices in the moral and
religious sphere, such as how young persons choose a way of
life. The moral and religious vitalities of the people of the
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United States-and also the artistic vitalities, scientific and
research vitalities, and vitalities of invention (as represented,
for example, in Nobel prizes)-do not seem weaker than
those visible in traditionalist, in Soviet-style, or in social dem-
ocratic systems.
Both freedom and the right to pursue happiness (alone
or in association with others) are inherently terrifying. In free
societies, one can only blame oneself for one's choices in life.
A free life is not the life of a hive, herd, or flock. Each per-
son is on the spot (as in baseball, each individual, though in
association with teammates, comes to the plate one at a time).
The terrors of liberty (which I have elsewhere called "the ex-
perience of nothingness") are not a sign of alienation, but of
authenticity.
As for loneliness, most Americans have a deserved repu-
tation for gregariousness and openness, are up to their ears
in associations of many kinds, and live as full a voluntary so-
cial life as any citizens on earth. Even our bumper-stickers say
"smile," and both a communal impulse and public-spirited-
ness are immensely powerful. I don't know about you, but I
am often dying to have a little more solitude, a little more
"loneliness."
About a third of our working population works in the
not-for-profit system. Becoming a saint, a mystic, a poet, a
folksinger, a drop-out--emphasizing "being" rather than
"doing" or "having"-are options pursued by many Ameri-
cans. Most, indeed, choose work in which they are happy, in
preference to work in which they might be paid more and
"have" more. In any case, there is ample room to choose to
live as one wishes, and even to be supported by others in do-
ing so.
7. What is a neo-conservative?
A neo-conservative is a person brought up as a person of
the left, who grew dissatisfied with the ideas and the spirit of
the left. Typically, this dissatisfaction arose because the way
of life of the left seemed to demand so many forms of false
consciousness and, above all, a loathing for the American sys-
tem. Most of us can recall in family memory our own real and
urgent poverty. Yet America did liberate us from poverty,
while other nations, to which members of our original lands
of birth also migrated (such as Brazil, Argentina, etc.), did
not liberate their immigrants. This difference is crucial to
our self-identity. In this respect and others, the analyses of
the left regularly involve the denial of one's own experience.
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The left also punishes anyone who begins to deviate and to
dissent. Dissenters are excommunicated, verbally abused,
driven out. That is why more and more young people, con-
stantly exposed to leftist criticism, are becoming disillusioned
with the left: in that sense, becoming neo-conservative.
The idea that will own the future is democratic capital-
ism. It works. Besides, not much is left of the left. A poster
announcing a socialist meeting in New York City two years
ago said it all: "What's left?"
8. But capitalism helps the rich, not the poor.
We were all-at one time-poor. Capitalism helped us,
and billions of others. Capitalism did little for duchesses, who
already had silk stockings, but much for the poor and work-
ing classes, who within two or three generations of capitalism
also had silk stockings-and tea, coffee, pepper, spices, and
many other goods once solely the prerogative of the rich.
In the aristocratic literary tradition, and in the Marxist
tradition, it is always asserted that capitalism is "exploita-
tive." But was that, even in 1830 or 1897 or 1931, a fair pic-
ture of events? If so, why did our families migrate in such
great numbers precisely toward the centers of capitalist activ-
ity? They well knew the exploitation of traditionalist societies.
They found capitalist forms comparatively liberating.
Even the 28 million blacks in the United States, arguably
the worst-off of the U.S. population, have a cumulative in-
come ($188 billion) larger than the gross domestic product of
all but nine other countries of the world, and more than half
as large as that of all the 551 million people of Africa.'
This is not to say that the three liberations to which
democratic capitalist societies are committed (political, eco-
nomic, and moral) have been accomplished. There is much
yet to do. But one must compare the realities of the liberal
society to the actual historical alternatives. Secondly, one
must compare the ideals of the liberal society to other active
ideals.
In my judgment, the liberal society is superior in the
realm of practice. And its ideals are morally more attractive.
Those ideals are the ideals of the future, both because they
work, and because they are most consonant with human na-
6. The estimate for the income of Black Americans for 1985 has
been computed by Brimmer and Company, Wash., D.C. The World Bank's
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1985 lists the gross domestic product for all
nations as of 1983. The cumulative gross domestic product of Africa in
1983 was $349 billion.
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ture itself. Thomas Jefferson succinctly stated the ideal of the
liberal society: "The God who gave us life gave us liberty."7
And the Catholic intellect who towers over the nineteenth
century, Alexis de Tocqueville, observed quite correctly that
the heart of Christianity discerns in human liberty the dignity
of the child of God. Few have stated more clearly the "Pro-
position" on which the United States is built than John
Courtney Murray, S.J., when he wrote:
The American Bill of Rights is not a piece of eighteenth-
century rationalist theory, it is far more the product of
Christian history. Behind it one can see, not the philosophy
of the Enlightenment but the older philosophy that had
been the matrix of common law. The "man" whose rights
are guaranteed in the face of law and government is,
whether he knows it or not, the Christian man, who had
learned to know his own personal dignity in the school of
Christian faith.'
Ironically, the liberal society, some of whose first historical
protagonists were anti-religious, owes its originating insights
about the dignity of the human person and the nature of
community to Jewish and Christian inspirations, and does not
make ultimate sense apart from biblical perceptions.
Not accidentally, perhaps, most of the prominent neo-
conservatives are Catholic and Jewish, loyal to traditions
older than modernity.
7. Robert N. Bellah summarizes the context:
That the Mosaic analogy was present in the minds of leaders at
the very moment of the birth of the republic is indicated in the
designs proposed by Franklin and Jefferson for a seal of the
United States of America. Together with Adams, they formed a
commitee of three delegated by the Continental Congress on July
4, 1776, to draw up the new device. "Franklin proposed as the
device Moses lifting up his wand and dividing the Red Sea while
Pharaoh was overwhelmed by its waters, with the motto 'Rebellion
to tyrants is obedience to God.' Jefferson proposed the children of
Israel in the wilderness 'led by a cloud by day and a pillar of fire
by night.'"
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WORLD 188 n.5 (1970), quoting 1 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE
UNITED STATES 467-68 (1950). For related texts, see the anthology in C.
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8. J.C. MURRAY, WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS: CATHOLIC REFLECTIONS ON
THE AMERICAN PROPOSITION 390 (1960).
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